There is a view that the financial sector of the post-war British economy was in need of reform that was postponed to the detriment of growth for 30 years until liberalisation started in full earnest after the election of 1979. There is another side of the story in this comparison. The first three decades of the post war period witnessed a decline in the share of wages accruing to the top percentile of earners. The trend was reversed around 1979, without any commensurate rise in output per person employed. The average growth rate of GDP in the second period was no greater than that in the first period because cyclical fluctuations were deeper. The de-regulation of the financial system allowed for recycling the wealth of the rich to contribute to housing inflation and rent seeking opportunities, creating an illusion of prosperity.
I.

Introduction
Concern has been expressed by US economists for quite some time about increasing inequality (Thurrow 1984) , but especially about the trend in the polarisation of income distribution at the extremes (Levy 1987) . Various measures have been proposed (Levy and Murnane 1992, Wolfson 1994) to describe this type of income inequality. Following the credit crunch and meltdown in the banking sector, a specific attention of focus in the US and also in the UK has been the growing disparity between the top 1 per cent and the rest 99 per cent of the wage earners (Atkinson 2005, Atkinson, Pickety and Saez 2011) . A reason for this concern is that the failed banking sector is a contributor to the concentration at the top, and financial sector remunerations may contain a significant element of rent (Philippon and Reshef 2009) .
i To the extent that expenditure of resources is entailed in rent capture, this has been to the detriment of economically efficient allocation of resources in the economy (Turner 2010, Ceccheti and Kharroubi 2012) .
ii
We divide the post-war period of 1950-2007 into two parts, 1950-1979 and 1980-2007, periods of pre-and post-liberalisation of the financial sector. During the first two decades of the post-war period, the financial sector was shielded from competition and, in return, this industry submitted to restriction on activities. A small number of clearing banks held "85% of total UK banking assets" and these banks "were almost entirely funded by customer deposits, 60% of which were held in [non-interest-bearing] current accounts". These banks limited themselves mostly to the provision of short term loans to businesses (Davies and Richardson 2010:322) . There were specialised investment banks providing other corporate services, for example under-writing issues of new securities and engaging in trade finance and dealing in foreign exchange. Housing finance was largely left in the domain of building societies which emerged as mutual organisations in the distant past. Ensuring the stability of the financial system was the main concerns of the authorities until the memories of the depression era began to fade. The call for introducing competition in banking became louder leading Jack Revell (1973:113) to lament that " [m] odern thinking tends to deny that banks are unique among financial institutions …" He was especially concerned about the externalities of the "payments mechanism in the economy… [because] its influence reaches into all corners.".
The lack of competition was addressed in the Competition and Credit Control Act of 1971, allowing all types of banks to engage in newer activities and reducing prudential regulatory constraints on the leverage ratio and financing foreign investment. However, some of the changes were slow in coming. For example, the leverage ratio increased slowly until further liberalisation of the banking system that were initiated in the 1980s (Chart 14 Davies and Richardson 2010:329) .
Problems in manufacturing in the 1970s were partly laid at the door of the banking sector, and a committee under the chairmanship of a former Prime Minister (Wilson Committee) was set up to review, amongst other things, the provision of finance needed for industrial innovations. The Committee published various interim reports in a "deliberate attempt to stimulate informed discussion" (Moore 1981:33) before the final report was issued in 1980.
By that time, the political desire for radical change in favour of de-regulation had gained momentum, and legislation followed.
There was another distinguishing feature of the second period, which we call the period of liberalisation. The share of wages in the economy for the top 1 per cent of wage earners having steadily declined since 1950 began to rise sharply around 1979 (Atkinson 2005) .
Executive compensation in the corporate sector began to rise so sharply that Sir Nicholas
Goodison, the then Chair of the London Stock Exchange, was reported to have expressed disquiet about these developments in testifying before a parliamentary committee in 1988 (Rodgers 1988:11) . He was reported to have used strong language in describing, especially, the decoupling of executive compensation from any realistic measure of performance.
The trends in gross domestic product do not suggest that the UK economy performed better during the period of liberalisation than it did in the previous decades following the war (1950-1979) . We have left out the financial crash after 2007. Volatility in the yearly growth rates in GDP increased in the second period. It may also be the case that very large incomes that accrued to the very few in this period may have been circulated through the financial system to create asset price bubbles, especially in housing assets for those that could obtain a mortgage, producing an illusion of prosperity that was not there. We find that the rise in the share of wages of the top 1 per cent is strongly correlated with rise in mortgage advances.
Household debt rose sharply in the back of asset price rises creating a sense of well-being as consumption spending rose. As explained by Bhaduri (1973 Bhaduri ( , 1977 in the context of "backward agriculture", changes in ownership, per se, can benefit certain groups of investors without necessarily increasing productivity. Whilst a group of individuals can benefit from investment which provides return by inflating the price of existing assets, this type of investment does not necessarily increase productivity and output in the economy. We find that output per person employed in the country during the second period did not improve over the first.
iii The paper is organised as follows. Section II below sets out the background information and contains a discussion of the data. Section III identifies changes in trends and cyclical patterns, and Section IV concludes.
II. Background and Data
Measurement of the output of an economy, the gross domestic product, is based on the conventional identity of equating output of goods and services available in the economy with the money in households' pockets to purchase the output. GDP is thus set equal to the sum of wages and profits prevailing in the economy.
In a market economy under perfect competition, a competitive equilibrium is defined by the following outcome: the relative prices of goods reflect the relative cost of production at the margin in terms of other goods, and wages track the contribution of labour to the marginal product. Prices obtaining in a competitive equilibrium are known as market clearing prices equating supply and demand for every commodity and service, "under certain conditions" (Hahn 1982 :5) . When these conditions, the assumptions entailed in the model of perfect competition, do not hold, wages and profits are partly determined by competition for influencing prices. This attempt at influencing prices in favour of oneself is called rent seeking behaviour, and it entails "expenditure of real resources" which might otherwise have gone to increase the output of the economy (McNutt 1996: 139) . When the share of wages of the top percentile rises sharply, it is difficult to hold on to the belief of the emergence of a competitive equilibrium brought about by liberalisation.
The sharp rise in the share of wages of the top percentile in the UK economy since 1979 is explained by trends in the performance related pay for top executives that are often based on movements in share prices which then become the focus of attention by corporate management. Analysing UK data on employee remunerations, Bell and Van Reenen (2013:156) note that executive performance is indeed measured in terms of share prices.
Moreover, much of the performance related pay accrues to senior executives, and it is "practically non-existent for workers". In so far as some of these wages may have in fact fed into a rise in the price of existing assets, published figures for GDP may have over-estimated the contribution of liberalisation to real output. It does not seem credible that the rise in pay for the top earners corresponds to any real rise in the productivity of these earners. Similar changes have taken place also in the United States. "Before the mid-1970s there was a broad social consensus: executives were well paid, but not fabulously so; rents got divided largely between loyal workers and management" ( Using standard measure of value added by industrial sectors, the financial sector in the UK is a success story. For example, if it were not for "the 'excess' growth of financial services, the growth rate over this period would have been reduced by 0.2 per cent per annum (Weale 2009:4) . Rent is conflated with output in the above method of measuring the contribution of the financial services to the economy: "… it is possible for financial activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economy (sic) value." (Turner 2010, Ch 1).
The rationale for many of these high rewards is now being brought into question. Malkiel (2013) finds that fees charged by US asset management funds are not warranted by performance. These funds which charge fees for actively managing investment allegedly using their expertise provide no better returns for clients, often they generate worse returns, than investment in a broad-based portfolio chosen to follow some chosen stock market index.
The impetus for examining the growing divide in wages between the top 1 per cent and the rest, especially when the much of the top wages accrued to those that are now blamed for collapse in output, is motivated partly by historical debates seeking distributive legitimacy in society. iv The legitimacy of unequal distribution in market economies derives from the connection between contribution and reward when markets are allowed to operate unfettered, and the assumption that choice made by one economic agent has no impact on any other holds. As long as the initial distribution is accepted as fair, subsequent market prices and wages arrived through voluntary transactions enjoy legitimacy according to the procedural view of justice of the market distribution of income: "If each person's holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just" (Nozick 1973:49) . If wages are distorted by rent capture by special interests, the legitimacy in the distribution of income in a market economy where some can be very rich and others poor comes into question. Put it bluntly, unequal distribution in income resulting from market transactions "can be tolerated as long as every individual feels that his position in it due to fate or to his own merits". (Robinson 1971:93) .
In real life, markets may be constrained by imperfections, for example due to the existence of oligopolies, monopolies, and organised pressure groups. Arguments for social intervention to keep in check those who seek to take advantage of market imperfection by capturing rent through, for example, forming cartels, are rejected by those who subscribe to the Friedman conjecture (Friedman 1962 ). The conjecture is that attempts at rent seeking though collusion amongst subsets of economic agents to form a cartel are not likely to succeed in the long run, An advantage of the method that we use for smoothing and trend extraction is that it allows the computation and plot of the corresponding velocity vii measures for the underlying level series. Such a measure has two advantages over the traditionally used "rate-of-change" series,
i.e. growth rates or trend deviations, such as in Figure 3 .2: first, it produces a smoother plot of the evolution of the change over time and, second, it allows us to more easily identify periods of particular interest in the series. The velocity diagrams in Figure 3 .3 below tell an interesting story. During the first period, the velocity was negative (although rising) for the share of wages accruing to the top 1 per cent, indicating that the share was in decline. The velocity became positive and rose sharply for a period after 1979, indicating a sharp rise in the top percentile's share of the total wage, and then the velocity settled down to a constant but remaining positive whilst the velocity of the increase in real GDP sharply declined, starting this decline well before the onset of the financial crisis. This gives rise to the possibility that the share of wages accruing to the top 1 per cent may have gone not into purchasing new output but into pushing up asset prices, after the beginning of liberalization.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note two additional things from these velocity plots: first, see that before 1979 the velocity of GDP was approximately constant and, second, that the sudden rise in output velocity occurs after the top per cent velocity has reached its peak at about the 1990's. Moving on, we note that the above visuals are supported by some straightforward tests. The average growth rate in the second period was not statistically significantly greater although inequality was higher (Table 3 .1). We can see the mean growth estimates for both series as well as the corresponding test for equal means (note that the tests were performed using robust standard errors from which the corresponding p-values were calculated).
If it is now assumed that the share of profits have accrued at the same rate as the share of wages for the top 1 per cent of wage earners, we can calculate the percentage change in the share of GDP accruing to the top 1 per cent between our comparison periods (Table 3 .2).
viii During the second period , the trend rate of growth in RGDP was the same as it was in the earlier period, and RGDP doubled (105 per cent increase), but the share of the top 1 per cent increase by 160 per cent. This contrasts with a decrease of 47 per cent in the first period. Changes in the output per job and changes in the wage share of the top 1% is positively correlated in the first period but the coefficient is negative in the second period ignoring the precipitous downturn after 2007. The correlation is significant at 10 per cent level in the first period and it is not significant in the second period . The coefficient becomes positive in the second period if the period is extended by two years , but still remains insignificant. It is difficult to justify the remarkable rise in the wages share of the top 1% as a reward for contribution to greater productivity in the country. ix Output per job filled in the economy did not change between the periods (Table 3 .3 below). Our results so far can be strengthened if we consider a simple VAR model for the three variables of interest together: real GDP (RGDP), top 1 per cent share of wages (TOP1) and output per person employed in the economy (OUTPUTPERJOB). Due to the small sample available to us, and the lack of evidence for co-integration among the three series, we consider the annual growth rates in performing our computations. First, we consider the Granger causality among the variables and then we present the corresponding impulse responses. (Table 3 .4) suggest the following. Increases in productivity (OUTPUTPERJOB) and real GDP (RGDP) growth probably cause the growth of the share of wages of the top percentile (TOP1) to go up. However, an increase in TOP1 growth does not have a significant causal effect on productivity. An increase in real GDP is, however, followed by a rise in productivity. Neither TOP1 nor OUTPUTPERJOB has a significant causal association with changes in real GDP. Admittedly the model is basic, the data seem to support our earlier conjectures about the relationship on the temporal path of GDP and productivity growth with the wage growth of the top 1 per cent.
Another way of looking at the impact on variables on each other is to look at the impulse responses of variables due to changes in other variables ( Figure 3 .4 below). The red lines define the 95 per cent confidence interval, computed via bootstrap to enhance inference due to the small sample we have available.
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. Response of RDGP to OUTPERJOB As we can see from the table above, for first time buyers, and after 1979, 21% of variation for mortgage advances can be explained by the growth in top 1 per cent share, even after accounting for the own dynamics in mortgage advances. As it became cheaper to borrow, even those that did not enjoy the fruits of liberalisation through higher wages enjoyed an illusion of prosperity as house prices soared. The reality is that asset bubbles cannot continue to grow indefinitely. They eventually burst. Attitude surveys suggest that a belief developed amongst majority of professional economists both in the UK and the US that the individual and social interests are aligned in a free market economy (Kearl et al 1979) . They became persuaded by Nozick's assertion that income distribution "according to benefits to others is a major patterned strand in a free capitalist society" (Nozick 1974: 158) . Even those economists that doubted that proposition in its extreme version, for example Varian (1975) , often did so simply on technical grounds of the transmission of noise through time in the determination of wages and profits, and not on the substantive problems of measurement of contribution. This consensus may be coming into question because of the emergence during the final quarter of the 20 th century a sharp divergence in the trends of income between a very small minority of one percent and the rest.
Ayres and Edlin (2011) urge social intervention to correct this particular type of inequality between the top percentile and the rest. We have outlined evidence that justifies concern about the particular type of inequality, 1 percent versus the rest, which has emerged.
